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Current and prospective migration law and policy in Chile does not adequately incorporate 
the causes, content, and consequences of international migration to and from Chile. We 
describe and examine migration in-flows, out-flows, and migration-related policies and 
how those policies drive, and are driven by, notions of development in Chile. We explore 
contradictions in Chilean nascent migration policy currently under legislative review. We 
argue that it is imperative that migration, migration policy, and their relationship to 
development be discussed inclusively and transparently and be explicitly incorporated into 





Migration Policy and Development in Chile 
 
Introduction 
The migration/development nexus revolves around the impacts that migration has in 
both the countries of origin and destination (Mullan and Doña-Reveco, 2012). 
Conventionally, international migration occurs as a result of development imbalance 
between ‘rich’ and ‘poor’ countries and development assisting migrant remittances benefit 
sending areas while “brain gain” benefits receiving countries (Sorensen & Van Hear, 2003). 
These conventions apply mostly to migration flows from the ‘underdeveloped’ South to the 
‘developed’ North. The migration and development nexus within southern middle- to high-
income countries is much less studied and poorly understood (Gould, 2009; Sanderson, 
2010).  
Chile, recently transitioned to a high-income country, is also transitioning from a 
migrant sending country to a migrant-receiving nation. Official migration- and 
development-related policies are roiled by ideological tensions and contradictions arising 
between development and security concerns on the one hand and Chile’s new role as 
simultaneously a migrant-sending and a migrant-receiving nation on the other. In this 
article we explore and describe these tensions and contradictions and we analyse current 
attempts to develop formal migration laws and policies in Chile. 
Beginning in the early 1990s, economic growth, political stability, and perceived 
social safety led to increased immigration in Chile. Early in the decade this immigration 
consisted of children and foreign spouses of former exiles who were considered foreigners 
both of extant citizenship laws and because they were born abroad were considered 
foreigners. Subsequently, in the second half of the decade, especially in the capital 
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Santiago, a growing number of Peruvian immigrants increased the previously small 
Peruvian community originally formed by Fujimori era refugees and older high-income 
Peruvian immigrants. While this migration was new in Santiago, it was an established trend 
in the north of the country where decades of cultural and socioeconomic integration have 
produced multiple-nation migratory exchanges since before the establishment of the South 
American nation-states (Pellegrino, 1995; Cano Christiny, et al. 2009). 
The new millennium saw new migration to Chile mostly from Latin America, but 
increasingly also from Asia and Africa (Martínez, 2003). To date the state has not reacted 
proactively to this migration. Chile’s current migration policy lacks coherence and is 
fundamentally based on a set of migration administrative laws created within a completely 
different historical context established during Pinochet’s dictatorship (1973-1990). While 
the Chilean state has implemented important administrative policies and actions, such as 
equal access to public health and public education for immigrants and their children 
regardless of migratory status (Gobierno de Chile, 2008; Agar Corbinos, 2010), immigrants 
still encounter discrimination and difficulties preventing them from full and active 
participation in Chilean society. Survey data from 2007 showed Chile to be the third-most 
adverse country to the arrival of immigrants in Latin America (Corporación 
LatinoBarómetro, 2008). While receiving unprecedented immigration flows, the largest 
since the late nineteenth century, Chilean emigration stock continues to be larger than its 
immigration stock.1. Since the return of democracy in 1990, despite Chilean state efforts to 
develop connections with Chileans living abroad, the country does not have a 
comprehensive policy to deal with its “diaspora.” 
Like most law in Chile, migration laws are designed by the executive branch of the 
government and sent to the bicameral Congress for discussion, modification, and approval. 
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Since the return to democracy in 1991, different executives have developed migration laws 
in 1993, 2002, and 2013. After almost three years of discussion, the law of 1993 was 
shelved. The draft of the 2002 law was never sent to Congress, although some of its 
components became the source for the Instructivo Presidencial No. 9, a policy definition 
document but not in any way legally binding (Gobierno de Chile, 2008). The draft of the 
2013 law was prepared in very different political and social contexts. It was prepared under 
a centre-right government and, unlike the 1993 and 2002 attempts, it was drafted in an era 
when migration was significant both numerically and, as important, as part of the national 
consciousness. Moreover, in 1993 Chile was emerging from 17 years of dictatorship, and in 
2002 the country was recuperating from the most severe economic crisis since 1982, 
whereas the 2013 law was prepared when Chile was growing economically, and 
unemployment was low even though charges of social inequalities in education, access to 
health, and other social services were still being levied against the government. As of very 
late 2013, the draft migration legislation has neither been approved, nor been thoroughly 
discussed by Congress. While we acknowledge that this nascent migration legislation may 
change during current congressional discussions or may even be shelved (unlikely), we 
posit that exploring, describing, and explaining this legislative draft in its current form 
permits us to dissect its the ideological underpinnings and its relationship to and impact on 
migration flows and development.  
Using the latest available draft of the future Chilean migration policy (República de 
Chile. Cámara de Diputados, 2013a: 155-204), we review changes in Chilean international 
migration trends, patterns, and associated policies since the early 1990s. We discuss how 
proposed new migration policies relate to Chilean concepts of development, emphasizing 
policy contradictions arising from a state-centred view of migrants as both the object and 
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subject of human rights and security concerns. Following Mármora (2002), we conclude 
with a call for Chilean policymakers and state officials to discuss migration policy more 
openly and transparently and to disseminate priorities, rationale, recommendations, and 
results widely. 
Migration policies and contemporary migration patterns in Chile 
By the early twentieth-first century there were more foreign-born people in Chile than 
during any previous historical period. At only 2.1 per cent, however, the proportion of 
foreign-born among the total population in 2009 was lower than in other historical periods. 
Even at its highest, in 1907, only 4.1 per cent of the Chilean population was born abroad; a 
much smaller proportion compared to the 30 per cent foreign born residing in Argentina at 
about the same time (Benencia, 2012). Comparatively globally and cross-nationally, the 
current percentage of foreign born in Chile is also lower than the world average (3%), 
lower than that of other countries such as the United States (12%), and is extremely small 
when compared to the over 90 per cent of countries such as United Arab Emirates (Cano 
Christiny, 2010; Gobierno de Chile, 2012). Media reports emphasize the seeming ubiquity 
of the foreign born population in Chile, especially in a country not accustomed to 
significant foreign-born populations. This apparent ubiquity has given rise to public 
reaction, especially in the printed press, that ranges from negative commentary on the 
“waves” of migrants coming to the country, on overt cases of discrimination against the 
foreign born, and on the formation of groups to “defend” Chilean culture against invasions 
from other countries (Cano Christy et al. 2009; Doña-Reveco and Levinson, 2012). 
International migration flows changed after 1990. After 40 years of continuous 
decrease, the 1982 census had recorded the lowest percentage ever of foreign-born in Chile 
(0.75%), attributable to the mortality of older European migrants and the appeal of 
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Argentina and other Latin American nations (Doña-Reveco and Levinson, 2012). However, 
after 1992 the foreign-born population grew by over one third and by 2002 Chile had the 
largest absolute number of foreign-born ever recorded. According to the estimates of the 
Departamento de Extranjería y Migración (colloquially known as Extranjería), by 2009 
this population almost doubled again, growing 91% in seven years (see table 1 and Doña-
Reveco and Levinson, 2012).2 Most of this growth came from immigrants to Chile from 
Latin American countries. 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
The immigrant population has continued to grow apace during the last three years. 
Data from the Permanencias Definitivas (Residence Permits, equivalent to United States 
Green Cards) show 70% to 75% of newcomers are from neighbouring Argentina, Peru, and 
Bolivia, plus others from Colombia and Ecuador. All in all, 90% of those granted residence 
permits are from only 14 countries; all of the South American nations, the United States, 
Spain, Cuba, Mexico, and China. Unlike “immigrants” with other types of visas, resident 
visa holders are immigrants committed to living in Chile for more than two years. 
According to Extranjería, the number of resident permits issued increased by 45% between 
2011 and 2012, fuelled by the growth in the Peruvian, Bolivian, and Colombian 
communities. Apart from immigrants from the Americas, Spain contributes most to 
immigrant growth between 2011 and 2012; easily explained by the economic crisis in Spain 
(El Mercurio 2012c; 2013).  
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
The Chilean state has responded to these recent migration flows and associated public 
concern with interest and a determination to discuss the development and implementation 
of a migration policy. Specifically, the state developed in 2002, through the Extranjería, a 
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document specifying the intentions that the state had with regards to immigration. The last 
time the state designed a migration policy was in the 1950s (Vodanovic, 1985) and what 
has guided state actions and “policy” on migration in the last thirty years have been two 
decree-laws enacted during Pinochet’s dictatorship that really simply define the acts of 
Extranjería and does not really constitute a formal migration policy. 
The document constructed by Extranjería and the Government was, for the time of its 
publication, fairly advanced. At its core was the principle of the protection of the Human 
Rights of migrants, which in turn led Chile to ratify the United Nations’ International 
Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their 
Families in 2005.3 A framework of sorts was proposed to manage migration flows in order 
to improve “governability” and control over migrants. It also introduced the idea of 
immigrant incorporation, respecting the immigrants’ culture of origin and not forcing the 
immigrants to acculturate to Chilean culture. Although never formally legislatively 
implemented, some components–in particular those not requiring parliamentary approval–
have been applied with mixed results by different agencies of the Chilean state. These 
components were brought together in the Instructivo Presidencial No. 9 defining the 
Chilean state’s involvement in migration across four axes centred on respect and protection 
of human rights: Chile as a welcoming country, immigrant integration, international 
agreements on migration themes, and regulation and administration of migration flows 
(Gobierno de Chile, 2008). This policy “proto-document” also included a set of “good 
practices” that the State committed to follow in its relationship with migrants regardless of 
their migratory status: to provide equal access in the public system to health, education, 
housing and crime protection.4 This reaffirmed the participation of Chile in the South 
American Conference on Migration5 and the Ibero-American Forum on Migration and 
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Development.6 These two regional consultative bodies/processes have as their objective the 
airing and discussion of informal and non-binding dialogue on international migration. 
Compared with the increase in immigration to Chile and its emergence as a topic of 
public debate and interest, Chilean communities abroad–proportionally and numerically 
more relevant than immigration to Chile–received scant coverage in the media or in official 
public policy statements. According to most recent estimates, in 2005 more than 850,000 
Chileans lived abroad; about half of them in Argentina (Chile. MINREL. DICOEX, 2005). 
Other relevant receiving countries are the US (110,000), Sweden (42,000), Canada (37,000) 
and Australia (33,000). Beside those living in Argentina, there are about 100,000 Chileans 
living throughout South America. Grouping the foreign-born together, these Chileans 
would constitute the sixth most populous region out of the fifteen internal regions of Chile 
(Chile. MINREL. DICOEX, 2005). A significant number of these emigrants are former 
exiles from Pinochet’s dictatorship. Although it is difficult to definitively estimate the 
number of Pinochet-era exiles, the most accepted estimates range between 300,000 and 
500,000 (Norambuena, 2000). Similarly, there are no good estimates of the number of 
exiles who did not return to Chile after the restoration of democracy in 1990. The best 
estimates are that less than half of the total number of exiles had returned by the mid-1990s 
(Wright and Oñate, 2007). After 1990 Chilean emigration continued and indeed increased. 
Currently, it is composed mostly of business people who have achieved success with the 
still current economic model, developed during Pinochet’s dictatorship, economically 
displaced workers (due to the same economic model), and young professionals who have 
left the country to continue their studies and who often stay in the country of reception after 
completing their studies (Doña-Reveco, 2011; Doña-Reveco and Levinson, 2012). 
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
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The Chilean state has developed several initiatives with regards to emigration in the 
last twenty years, but even taken together they do not constitute an emigration policy. First, 
Chile has signed and ratified more than 23 social security agreements with countries that 
send and that received emigrants to and from Chile (Gobierno de Chile, 2012). Second, like 
other Latin American nations, in the mid-1990s Chile formed the Dirección para las 
Comunidades Chilenas en el Exterior (DICOEX: Department for the Chilean Communities 
Abroad). This department, part of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, seeks as its main 
objective to establish and maintain connections between the Chilean state and its emigrants. 
Third, in 2002 and 2003 the Chilean state organized a “census” of Chileans abroad in order 
to establish the minimum number of Chileans living in other countries and to gather 
statistical information on their socio-demographic characteristics. Fourth, an important 
change in the constitution went into effect in 2005 regarding nationality law. This 
addendum eliminated the requirement of residence in Chile for a year for the Chilean born 
abroad in order to be eligible to obtain nationality; representing a change from a jus solis to 
a jus sanguinis policy. Also it eliminated the requirement to relinquish Chilean nationality 
in cases where a Chilean had obtained another nationality. There are still some citizenship 
rights that require living in the country, for example running for political office. Finally, 
during the last twenty years and particularly since 2005, there has been debate at 
governmental level, media level and within some civil society organizations with regard to 
giving voting rights to Chileans abroad (similar to policies adopted by the Mexican 
government towards Mexican migrants living in the United States). In Chile, this debate 
has centred on whether someone living abroad has permanent connections and enough 
knowledge of Chile’s internal current affairs to earn the right to vote and on how best to 
“measure” and evaluate the strength of those ties (Doña-Reveco and Levinson, 2013). 
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Discourse on developing a comprehensive Chilean migration policy was almost 
completely absent during the presidential campaign of 2009 (Doña-Reveco, 2010) in 
general, and in particular among the governmental programme coalition that won the 
elections in 2010 (Piñera, 2009). In 2010 the government of Sebastian Piñera–the first 
president in a centre right coalition to win the presidency in Chile since 1958–began a 
media and newspaper public campaign to announce that it was preparing migration reform 
legislation that included a comprehensive migration policy. In October of 2010, El 
Mercurio–the leading conservative newspaper–editorialized that the government was 
preparing a comprehensive migration policy, and that “…good legislation (on migration) 
and a thorough understanding (on behalf of the country) of the benefit of immigration” 
would avoid the problems that migration has brought to developed countries (El Mercurio, 
2010). Finally, in 2012, the same newspaper reported that the government was working on 
a new migration law (El Mercurio, 2012a; 2012b). This law, however, has not included the 
participation of the civil society or of scholars/policy-makers, academics, and other experts 
and interested parties with knowledge of international migration (Jimenez, 2013). The 
government was to submit this new migration legislation to parliament in August of 2012, 
but it entered parliamentary discussion only in June of 2013. This legislation supposedly 
will incorporate the government’s political and ideological intentions with regards to 
migration and reportedly will not be a direct continuation of the perceived progress 
achieved on migration “policies” in the last 10 years (El Mercurio, 2012b; Bellolio et al. 
2012). We turn now to an analysis of this migration policy draft with a particular focus on 
the intersections between migration and development. 
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Development for whom? 
As far as international migration and development are concerned Chile has an 
intrinsic ‘personality’ problem, perhaps even a “disorder.” Within a world systems analogy 
(Wallerstein, 2004), it is currently a semi-peripheral country yet with the highest per capita 
income in Latin America, the highest socio-economic inequality rates, a large emigrant 
stock, and an increasing immigrant flow (http://data.worldbank.org/country/chile; Cano 
Christiny, 2009). Chile is a high class country that has only recently left its lower class 
origins; a petite bourgeois country. This impacts how the state considers migrants both in 
the context of development and in the context of reception and policies of migrant 
incorporation. 
Conventionally, although notions of sustainability are rewiring this, the notion of 
national development is teleological in that development is an end-of-state situation to 
which nation-states aspire after following a set of particular “recipes,” mostly economic 
and often defined by international organizations (Payne and Phillips, 2010; McMichael, 
2012). After the end of the Cold War, “less-developed” nations had two very similar 
options: to follow the neoliberal development approach exemplified by the United States or 
to follow the, receding, social democratic example of northern European nations. While the 
concept of development has had numerous definitions and a complicated epistemological 
history (see for example Nederveen Pieterse, 2010; Payne and Phillips, 2010), most 
common constructions are associated with the notion of economic development wherein 
countries achieve development by reaching a particular amount of per capita income. 
Overreliance on such a one-dimensional indicator underlay the creation of the United 
Nations Development Programme’s (UNDP) Human Development Index (HDI), first 
proposed in 1990 (UNDP, 1990). HDI goes beyond stark economic accumulative measures 
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to include measures of life expectancy, literacy, and infant and child mortality to assess 
human well being. Almost ten years later, the UNDP proposed eight “millennium 
development” goals that would define development by 2015 (McMichael, 2012). These 
goals aim to end poverty and hunger, achieving universal primary education, promoting 
gender equality and empowering women, reduce child mortality, improve maternal health, 
combat HIV, malaria and other diseases, ensure environmental sustainability and 
developing a global partnership for development (UNDP Website). In its 2011 annual 
report UNDP incorporated an ecological and environmental component into HDI 
measurement and assessment, formally recognizing for the first time that sustainable 
ecosystems are vital for human development. 
Problematically, the Chilean state and the government of Sebastián Piñera continue to 
construct national development in terms of more conventional pre-1990s understandings of 
economic development. In its governmental programme of 2009, Piñera states that the goal 
of his government is to return to the road to development through “entrepreneurship and 
innovation…to regain a high rate of economic growth, that is sustained and sustainable, 
that will allow to create more and better jobs” (Piñera, 2009: 15). By 2018 Chile aims to 
have a per capita income of US$22,000 per year; equal to the countries of Southern Europe. 
As recently as May 2012, the Chilean Secretary of the Treasury argued in El Mercurio that 
to achieve development the country needed to strengthen its institutions. Two institutions 
were singled out: the Council of Financial Stability and the System of Public Companies 
(Larraín, 2013). Both are centred on economic aspects of development. Such editorializing 
in Chile’s most official and established newspaper is tantamount to a definition of future 
policy. 
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Although the migration law draft asks directly “How can international migration 
collaborate in the road to development, on widest sense of the term?” (Gobierno de Chile, 
2012: 8 and 28), definitions and arguments as presented condition migration with economic 
development. Compounding this, the Chilean government has not yet proposed a national 
development policy in any area. The sole idea of migration’s contribution to development is 
to focus on what high income or highly educated migrants might contribute. Low-income 
migrant workers, the bulk of the current migration flow to Chile, are considered only as 
replacement for more productive populations to be redeployed elsewhere. 
In formulating a migration policy Chile’s current leadership seek to position the 
country as one in continuous growth with a significant migration policy development 
leadership role in the larger region. This fails to adequately consider the differences in 
macroeconomic indices and migration histories experienced by countries across the 
southern cone region and beyond. The document also argues that since most migrants 
migrate for labour reasons, Chile will continue to attract migrants due to its economic 
prosperity and socio-political tranquillity, ignoring the fact that most migrations are border-
area migrations and that Argentina, not Chile, has been historically the first choice for 
regional migrations (Massey, et al. 1998; Pellegrino, 1998). Chile is not likely to become 
the first choice for many regional migrants. Finally, migration intentions and propensities 
are connected to the development of projects in the mining sector, in the northern part of 
Chile, although there is no accurate information or data on the characteristics of 
international and internal flow to this area (El Mostrador, 2013). 
The policy draft criticizes the argument that migrants would reduce the income of 
nationals in particular economic sectors, but also states that the opportunities provided by 
immigration are far more numerous (Gobierno de Chile, 2012: 8-10). These opportunities 
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are mostly available to highly qualified migrants or to lower, manual-labour and service 
sector migrants that would liberate highly qualified migrants from home work. There is 
acknowledgement: that receiving and incorporating migrants with high qualifications can 
solve “local market deficits” (op. cit 9); of the innovation role of migrants; of the 
replacement of local workers in “markets that national are not willing to participate” (op. 
cit 9); and of the role that “some migrants [who] provide domestic services that allow the 
incorporation to the labour market of people with high levels of productivity” (op. cit 9). 
Also recognized are the higher capacity of migrants for internal migration and the 
entrepreneurial capacities of migrants, who therefore have “the potential to vitalize the 
entrepreneurial environment” (op cit 10). 
The connections drawn between development and migration are strongly focused on 
the economic aspects of migration, with particular strength given to the argument that 
migrants must acculturate to Chilean society (see below). The document does not 
problematise the key divisive characteristic of migration flows into Chile by differentiating 
between those who come to work as professionals and those who will replace lower level 
workers. Furthermore, while there is mention of the re-creation of a gendered labour market 
and of migrants’ right to repatriate their incomes, there is no discussion of Chilean state 
involvement or role in this. 
The draft document is explicit on the need for the state to create incentives for the 
construction of connections between Chile and its emigrants (Gobierno de Chile, 2012: 6). 
However, there is little or no acknowledgment of the current knowledge and research on 
states’ interaction with their emigrant populations and diaspora (see for example, 
Fitzgerald, 2006, 2009; Moses, 2011; 2012). Within a scant four articles of discussion, 
there is allusion to migrant return promotion, international reciprocity in terms of access to 
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rights, availability of information at consular offices and the development of a registry of 
Chileans abroad (Gobierno de Chile, 2012: 65-66). Ignored are any programmes to support 
effective return at all ages and educational levels. In an era of wide ‘brain circulation,’ there 
is no discussion of how the state might make lasting connections with emigrants who do 
not want to return but only to maintain sporadic contacts, or to even to send remittances, or 
to invest in newly emerging financial vehicles like diaspora bonds (Kathar and Ratha, 2009, 
2011). Lastly, especially important given why Chileans have left the country in the last fifty 
years, there is no systematic attempt to address how the state will stimulate activities and 
interest within and among Chileans overseas populations so as to reconnect with the nation. 
In sum, this migration policy draft document envisions the migration-development 
nexus solely as an economic connection, does not deal adequately with the different aspects 
of economic development, nor does it address the changing conditions that influence 
migration flows or the reception contexts that migrants might encounter. Nor does it 
develop mechanisms to engage with Chilean emigrants and involve them in development, 
economic or other. Since there is an acknowledgement that development is multifaceted, 
we turn now to a discussion of how this proposed legislation, presents immigration from a 
security perspective and what this means for the incorporation of migrants into Chile’s 
social and cultural development. 
Ideological contradictions in Chile’s Migration Policy 
The actions of the Piñera’s government on migration policy seem to be largely 
ideologically driven. The comments of the Undersecretary of Interior and other actions 
regarding foreigners (El Mercurio, 2012a; 2012b;) indicate something of a Janus-faced 
approach to migration legislation. One the one hand, language redolent of a ‘national 
security’ component, very similar to the laws of 1975 and to the 1953 migration policy, 
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does not correspond to a country respectful of differences and open to the world as Chile 
has been presented internationally. On the other hand, it seems that the project will continue 
to uphold the UN Convention on the rights of migrant workers and their families, 
facilitating migration reunification–with conditions–and providing access to the same 
conditions as Chileans with regard to health care, social security, and education access for 
migrants, regardless of their migratory status.  
As always, the devil is in the details. The policy draft assures that the state will 
provide health access to any migrant regardless of migratory condition, in particular to 
minors, (in cases of pregnancy, and urgent care) and will do so only in state-owned 
hospitals and health centres. In any other case the access to health will be only for 
permanent residents (Gobierno de Chile, 2013: 32). This contravenes the United Nations’ 
International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and 
Members of Their Families, which does not differentiate between documented and 
undocumented workers (United Nations, n.d). A similar situation occurs with the access to 
social security and with regards to expulsion or deportation. The current draft also goes 
against the Chilean Constitution and the American Convention on Human Rights, as the 
Chilean Supreme Court stated in its comments to the policy draft in July of 2013 
(República de Chile. Cámara de Diputados, 2013B: 288). 
Such contradictions bode ill for the application of the law. This ‘dual personality’ of 
nascent Chilean migration policy is very evident in the relationship between the state and 
the migrant. The Chilean state requests that its emigrants be welcomed yet it promotes a 
rather coercive immigration policy in that a ‘national security’ ideology permeates the 
entire document. Stating directly that “a regime open to immigration opportunities only 
makes sense it is possible, within due process, to promptly expel from [the country] those 
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who have been accredited of acting against common welfare” (Gobierno de Chile, 2012: 5) 
without any clarification of what is ‘common welfare’ is foreboding. 
Further emphasis on the security component is evident in such statements as “regular 
migration allows having an adequate control, maintaining national security as the 
informing criteria of every piece of legislation on migration” (Gobierno de Chile, 2012: 13 
emphasis added). This is reinforced in the definition of a National Migration Policy, which 
states that any migration policy must include the “politics of internal and external security, 
and the maintenance of law and order, especially on what refers to prevention and control 
of transnational organized crime, drug trafficking, terrorism and migrant trafficking” 
(Gobierno de Chile, 2012: 30). Similarly, the policy states that Chile must consider 
migration in relation to its international relations and its foreign policy. There is also 
mention of public safety within the context that every national migration policy should 
have in accordance with the (inexistent) “policies of national development”. And, when 
referring to reasons why an individual should not be allowed to be in Chile, there is twice 
mention of individuals that alter the social order of their country of origin and who might 
have done acts that could disturb the bilateral Chilean relations with other countries 
(Gobierno de Chile, 2012: 34). Considering the importance of the right of asylum in Latin 
American International Law, this allows the Chilean government to ideologically define if a 
open dissenters/opponents of their native country’s regime has the right to enter Chile if 
being persecuted. 
At an institutional level there is a proposal to create a Migration Policy Council–
which in theory has existed since 1975 but has never been enacted–whose role is to propose 
and update Chilean migration policy, to assist the Chilean president on migration topics, 
and the development and dissemination of technical reports. The Council is to be comprised 
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of the Ministers of Interior, Foreign Affairs, and Finance, reinforcing the connection 
between development and fiscal policy.9 Noticeably absent is the involvement of other 
important ministries that have come to be closely involved with immigrant populations, in 
areas such as Health, Education, and Housing. On the institutional level, the former 
Department of Extranjería becomes a Division within the Ministry of Interior, giving it 
greater relevance within the overall Chilean governmental structure. 
This policy draft prohibits the immigration of people who “suffer diseases that the 
health authorities have deemed they constitute a reason to impede the entrance to Chile” 
(Gobierno de Chile, 2012: 34). Nowhere are those diseases described or categorized, 
opening the way to charges of discrimination and arbitrariness. This is a very similar 
position also presented in the law that created the Extranjería, which prohibited entrance to 
Chile to people that through oral or written methods destroy the Chilean social order and 
that suffer “an incurable organic defect such as being deaf-mute, blindness, dementia, 
idiocy…or any that would prevent them from working to make a living” (Gobierno de 
Chile, 1953). The current document also focuses on national security as a main component, 
although it does accept the UN Convention on the rights of migrant workers and their 
families as the principal framework for the future law. The law will facilitate family 
reunification–with conditions–and will provide access in the same conditions as Chileans to 
health care and education to migrants regardless of their migratory status. This disconnect 
may undermine the effectiveness of the law since it seems to both protect and criminalize 
migrants. 
The draft of the Chilean migration policy proposes a “positive integration” of 
migrants to Chilean culture with respect of the migrant cultural differences. It accepts the 
relevance of including new cultures to Chile but warns of the potential negative effects to a 
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society that “is not used to social heterogeneity” (Gobierno de Chile, 2012: 11). This is a 
rather grandiose historical myth. The attempted construction of such a dichotomous social 
group based Chilean identity (Larraín, 2001) has been a constant for most governments in 
Chile in the twentieth century. Originally the dichotomy was between the colonizers and 
the ‘natives’, and later between the land based aristocracy and the peones, now continued 
during the last century within the context of a stratified society based mostly on one’s 
belonging to a particular social class. 
The policy draft also proposes that the goal of this law is the integration of these 
migrants to Chilean society while they maintain linkages to the societies of origin. The 
policy “recognizes the value of preserving the connections [with the home nation]” 
(Gobierno de Chile, 2012: 12) just as the government expects its own emigrants to keep 
linkages with Chile. At the same time, however, “it demands from migrants to know and 
respect the codes of conduct, the culture and the language of the country that has decided to 
receive them…it encourages to refrain from their own cultural expressions…the reform 
discourages multiculturalism, the conformation of enclaves composed by hermetic and 
homogeneous communities” (Gobierno de Chile, 2012:12). Later the draft stipulates that 
the state will encourage integration while taking cultural differences into consideration 
(Gobierno de Chile, 2012:28). In sum, the proposed draft legislation conceives migrant 
integration as social development but falls short of including it as part of the migration and 
development nexus. 
Conclusion 
The state is a key component and vital actor within overall national and sub national 
migration processes. All migrants at some point, by definition, cross at least one 
administrative border between states. In light of this, scholars of migration have given the 
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role of the state inadequate attention. This, we argue, is because the economic theories that 
until recently were the core of migration studies had at their basic premise that the migrant 
was free, had complete information, and freely decided the place and moment of his or her 
migration. More recent theories, originating in post-modern intellectual approaches also 
minimize and relativize the role of the state on migration. In general, they argue that to 
study and comprehend international migrations the state has become fairly irrelevant, since 
globalization, transnationalism and other contemporary phenomena have made physical and 
cultural borders porous and the states no longer have control over the spaces they govern. 
The state, however, is connected to migration both as a sender and as a receiver of 
population. Above all the state has the responsibility to protect the human rights of all 
migrants regardless of their place or origin, destination or migratory condition. 
While it is imperative that Chile has a new and comprehensive migration policy, the 
project that the Chilean government has under development is built on state ideologies from 
an earlier time. The notions of ‘national security,’ ‘morals,’ and ‘diseases’ resonate with 
and are very similar to the tone and wordings of the laws from 1975 and to the 1953 
migration policy and do not correspond to a contemporary country respectful of differences 
and open to the world as Chile has presented itself internationally. The nascent migration 
policy posits that “the national migration policy should have in consideration the 
contribution of migrants to the social, cultural, and economic development that migrants 
provide to the country” (Gobierno de Chile, 2012). However, the Chilean government has 
not recently proposed a comprehensive national development policy in any of these areas. 
Chile sees most problems arising from the lack of a proper legal framework to govern 
migration flows. Outdated laws do not comply with recommendations of human rights 
organizations, nor are they in accordance with the new realities of a democratic country 
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deeply immersed in a globalized world. While the development of a holistic migration 
policy would benefit both migrants and nationals alike, this process must take place in a 
context that considers the needs of both and educates Chileans on the benefits of moving 
toward a more inclusive and culturally rich society. In order to succeed, any migration 
policy must incorporate not only the participation of the state, but also of migrants, relevant 
NGOs, policy scholars and academics, and civil society in general. So far this has not been 
the case. Let us hope that this will happen in the parliamentary discussion. 
Epilogue 
On December 15, 2013 Michelle Bachelet won the Chilean presidential elections 
signalling the return of the centre-left to government after a four year hiatus. Her strong 
showing in this election, despite 55% voters not participating, and the support of her 
coalition in the parliamentary elections assures her the necessary votes to approve almost 
any migration law. International migration, however, represented a very small component 
of her government program (Bachelet, 2013). In a very brief manifesto statement, the 
president-elect proposes to frame any policy development within the context of the broad 
human rights international agreements and migrant’s rights agreements signed by the 
country. Chile will also continue to play an active role as a country of refuge, protection to 
victims of traffic, and to migrant development. This last component presents a striking 
change to Piñera’s migration law, from migration associated with economic development to 
a focus on the human development of migrants. While the incoming government alleges its 
commitment to inclusion, regional integration, and the rights of migrant workers, there is 
no information of how this will be done. With regards to Chileans abroad, there is a call to 
promote emigrant citizenship, although it is centred on voting rights, the development of 
connections between the Chilean state and communities abroad, and of civic participation. 
21 
These last two ‘rights’ are not defined in the document, as it is also not defined the 
participation of the civil society in this process. The limited relevance of this topic, the 
higher importance of a major constitutional change, a reformulation of public education at 
all levels, and of social security had during the campaign and in the government program 
suggests that the status-quo with regards to migration will be unlikely to change. The 
migration law promoted by the Piñera Government most likely continue its transit in 
Congress or be modified by a new draft developed by Bachelet’s government.  
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Chile (1982-2009est): Foreign-born population estimates and intercensal growth of foreign born population (Census Data)  
 
Country of Origin  
Census DEM estimate*  Intercensal growth (%) Growth (%) 
1982 1992 2002 2009  1982-1992 1992-2002 2002-2009 
South America                
Argentina 19,733 34,415 48,176 60,597  74.4 40.0 25.8 
Peru 4,308 7,649 37,860 130,859  77.6 395.0 245.6 
Bolivia 6,298 7,729 10,919 24,116  22.7 41.3 120.9 
Ecuador 1,215 2,267 9,393 19,089  86.6 314.3 103.2 
Brazil 2,076 4,610 6,895 9,624  122.1 49.6 39.6 
Venezuela 942 2,397 4,338 N/A  154.5 81.0   
Colombia 1,069 1,666 4,095 12,929  55.8 145.8 215.7 
North America                
United States 4,667 6,249 7,753 9,720  33.9 24.1 25.4 
Europe                
Spain 12,290 9,879 9,084 11,025  -19.6 -8.0 21.4 
Germany 6,125 5,603 5,473 6,547  -8.5 -2.3 19.6 
Asia                
China 669 1,170 2,401 4,589  74.9 105.2 91.1 
Other Countries 24,413 30,897 38,077 63,249  26.6 23.2 66.1 
Total 83,805 114,531 184,464 352,344  36.7 61.1 91.0 
* DEM: Departamento de Extranjeria y Migracion, Ministerio del Interior, Chile (Department of Immigration, Secretary of Interior, 
Chile) 




Chile (2010-2012): Foreign born population according to Residence Permits and growth of 
foreign-born populations 
 
Country of Origin Residence Permits  Annual growth (%) 
  2010 2011 2012  2010-2011 2011-2012 
South America            
Argentina 1,272 1,338 1,642  5.2 22.7 
Peru 7,736 8,117 11,026  4.9 35.8 
Bolivia 1,083 1,582 3,746  46.1 136.8 
Ecuador 878 902 1,082  2.7 20.0 
Brazil 432 475 696  10.0 46.5 
Venezuela 334 367 511  9.9 39.2 
Colombia 1,462 1,699 3,039  16.2 78.9 
North America            
United States 345 366 537  6.1 46.7 
Europa            
Spain 280 283 537  1.1 89.8 
Germany 181 166 233  -8.3 40.4 
Asia            
China 616 665 699  8.0 5.1 
Other Countries 2,471 2,833 3,563  14.6 25.8 
Total 17,090 18,793 27,311  10.0 45.3 
* Source: Departamento de Extranjeria y Migracion, Ministerio del Interior, Chile 




Chile: Ten main countries of emigration, first and second generation 
 












Other countries 95,630 
Source: INE-DICOEX 2003-2004. 
 
 
